Intra-industry trade between European Union and Transition Economies. Does income distribution matter? by Hubert Gabrisch & Maria Luigia Segnana
Intra-industry trade between European
Union and Transition Economies. Does
income distribution matter?
Hubert Gabrisch and Maria Luigia Segnana
Februar 2002 Nr. 155
Institut für    Halle Institute for Economic Research 
Wirtschaftsforschung Halle 





























Department of Central and Eastern Europe
gab@iwh-halle.de






Phone: ++39 0461 88 22 25
The responsbility for discussion papers lies solely with the individual authors. The views
expressed herein do not necessarily represent those of the IWH.
This study is part of the project ‘EU-Integration and the Prospects for Catching-UP
Developments in CEECs – The Determinants of the Productivity Gap’. Financial support is
provided by the EU (Fifth Framework Programme). Website of the project: http://www.iwh-
halle.de/projects/productivity-gap.
Herausgeber:
INSTITUT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSFORSCHUNG HALLE (IWH)
Postanschrift: Postfach 11 03 61, 06017 Halle (Saale)
Hausanschrift: Kleine Märkerstraße 8, 06108 Halle (Saale)
Telefon: (03 45) 77 53-60




EU-TE trade is increasingly characterised by intra-industry trade. For some countries
(Czech Republic), the share of intra-industry trade in total trade with the EU approaches
60 percent. The decomposition of intra-industry trade into horizontal and vertical shares
reveals overwhelming vertical structures with strong quality advantages for the EU and
shrinking quality advantages for TE countries wherever trade has been liberalised.
Empirical research on factors determining this structure in an EU-TE framework has
lagged theoretical and empirical research on horizontal trade and vertical trade in other
regions of the world. The main objective of this paper is, therefore, to contribute to the
ongoing debate over EU-TE trade structures, by offering an explanation of intra-industry
trade. We utilize a cross-country approach in which relative wage differences and
country size play a leading role. In addition, as implied by a model of the product-
quality cycle, we examine income distribution factors as determinates of the emerging
EU-TE structure of trade flows. Using OLS regressions, we find first, that relative
differences in wages (per capita income) and country size explain intra-industry trade,
when trade is vertical and completely liberalized and second, that cross country
differences in income distribution play no explanatory role. We conclude that if
increasing wage differences resulted from an increasing productivity gap between high-
quality and low-quality industries, then vertical structures will, over the long-term create
significant barriers for the increase in TE incomes and lowering EU-TE income
differentials.
JEL Classification F13
Keywords: Intra-industry trade, Eastern EuropeIWH __________________________________________________________________
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1. Introduction
This paper investigates intra-industry trade (IIT) between the European Union (EU) and
countries in transition (TE) in order to find an explanation for the emerging trade
patterns between both sets of countries. We test a model in which trade within the
industry of different countries is vertically and horizontally differentiated. Emerging
trade structures can be explained best in the absence of trade barriers. Trade in the
absence of trade barriers is rare, however. Therefore we examine two panels of EU-TE
trade, liberalised and non-liberalised.1
Underlying the model is a product-quality cycle (Flam and Helpman, 1987) that adds
income distribution to the usual explanatory country variables like relative income or
wage differences between countries and country size. The empirical analysis is for the
years 1993 and 1997 and on four TE countries: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland
and the Slovak Republic. The choice of the two years of comparison and of the four
countries was dictated by the availability of income distribution data. We further divide
trade into a panel of liberalised and non-liberalised items. The panel of non-liberalised
items was continuously liberalised after 1997 while trade in the other items was
liberalised in 1993 (according to the European Agreements).
The paper is organised as follows: Section two provides stylised facts on intra-industry
trade and income distribution. The facts reveal a significant fraction of EU-TE trade to
be vertically differentiated, and product flows between both sets of countries show a
significant quality cycle. We show further how income re-distribution from poorer to
richer households in TE countries influenced the distance to income distribution patterns
in the EU overall and in the individual member countries. Section three describes the
problems identified in the relevant literature. We identify controversial results in the
country and industry approaches, arguing that in both cases the main reason is the
missing attention either to liberalised/non-liberalised trade flows or to the different
components of IIT – horizontal (HIIT) and vertical (VIIT) trade. We present a product-
quality-cycle model of VIIT consisting of country factors, among them income
distribution. Adopting the country approach in section four, we find no empirical
evidence of theoretically expected results when we utilised the whole set of data. A
clearer result emerges when flows are considered separately, particularly for the
determinants of VIIT and HIIT in liberalised trade. Relative country differences in GDP
per capita and in size show important and different effects on the share of vertical and
horizontal intra-industry trade. Finally, we find income distribution patterns to influence
the share of VIIT but not in the direction suggested by the perspective of the product-
quality cycle. Section five concludes and adds some preliminary thoughts on the
perspective of EU-TE trade structure.
1 We gratefully express our thanks to Karin Szalai and Peter Schäfer f o rp r e p a r i n gt h ed a t ao ni n c o m e
distribution (Karin) and intra-industry trade (Peter). Responsibility of the study, of course, remains
with us.__________________________________________________________________ IWH
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2. Stylised facts on intra-industry trade and income distribution
in and between EU and TE
The integration process of TEs and EU countries has been characterised by trade
integration and various features of convergence, particularly in income distribution,
during the last decade.
In general, trade developments may be characterized as:
(1) increased intra-industry trade,
(2) dominance of vertical trade, and,2
(3) dominance of quality differences in trade.
Also, in general the characteristics of income distribution include:
(1) a redistribution of income from poorer to richer households in the TE country
group,
(2) a remarkable divergence in income inequality among TE countries, and,
(3) therefore, both a convergence and divergence of inequality in TE relative to EU
countries, in any case to the detriment of poorer households in TE countries.
2.1 Trade
Using EUROSTAT data for trade of the EU with the four mentioned TE countries we
find that the share of IIT in trade in all selected categories of the Combined
Nomenclature was between 20 percent for Poland and 52 percent for the Czech
Republic in 1997 (Table 1), calculated with unadjusted Grubel-Lloyd (G-L) indices. The
share increased in three out of four cases vis-à-vis the share in 1993. In the case of
Poland the share remained fairly constant for the unadjusted indices neglect trade
imbalances. Balanced trade is, however, a basic assumption of all models explaining
IIT. Adjusted for trade imbalances (high EU surplus), the shares of IIT turned out to be
remarkably higher in trade with all four countries. The adjusted IIT share for the Czech
Republic, for example, was almost 20 percentage points higher than the unadjusted
share, in 1993, and for Poland it doubled in 1997 compared with unadjusted shares.
Also over time, adjusted G-L indices show a significant increase of IIT in EU trade with
all four TE countries as against the unadjusted indices. This very dynamic change leads
us to ask what are the factors determining it. An initial answer is the possible
combination of trade liberalisation (due to the trade agreements from 1992) with
competitive advantages, both possibly being reflected in the high EU surplus in the
2 See also Landesmann and Burgstaller (1997); Aturupane et al. (1997); Rosati (1998), and Thom
(1999).IWH __________________________________________________________________
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period under consideration. Since the distinction between liberalised and non-liberalised
trade was most pronounced in the period 1993-1997, we split our dataset into two
panels: Panel A includes all items whose trade was completely liberalised between EU
and TE. They typically include industries particularly attractive to foreign direct
investors (Hunya, 2000). Panel B includes selected items whose trade was not
liberalised during the period under consideration. We selected mainly textiles and
clothing where the share of outward processing trade (OPT) was an overwhelming
feature of trade contracts (Lemoine, 1998), and foreign direct investment (FDI) played a
minor role.
3 The distinction between OPT and FDI is important insofar as both
strategies at the firm level influence the emergence of trade structures in a different way:
investments create new production while OPT utilises existing production.
Assume now, the EU to have a pronounced competitive advantage in liberalised trade.
We then would expect larger imbalances in panel A than in panel B and, consequently,
higher IIT shares. Data support this expectation. IIT shares were significantly greater in
Panel A than in Panel B. The adjusted G-L index took almost 100 percent in EU trade
with Poland in liberalised trade but only 24 percent in non-liberalised trade in 1997. The
gap between the unadjusted and the adjusted shares is by far larger in Panel A than in
Panel B, and also the increase of adjusted shares turned out to be somewhat weaker in B
than in A. Thus the first conclusion is: When trade is liberalised and when one side has
a competitive advantage, this advantage exerts a more pronounced impact on IIT than
under less liberalised conditions. Which kind of competitive advantage this might be
will show the decomposition between horizontal and vertical trade structures.
The decomposition
4 shows a clear VIIT dominated trade structure (Table 2). VIIT
accounted for about 76 per cent of total trade (EU-Slovakia) and 84 per cent (EU-Czech
Republic) in 1997.
A competitive advantage in quality of the EU vis-a-vis the TEs materialises particularly
in liberalised trade. The shares of VIIT in Panel A are much greater than in Panel B. IIT
in Panel A was almost completely vertical in EU trade with Hungary – a feature that
poses a question concerning the usual assessment of FDI and its structural effects.
Hungary has attracted the highest FDI per capita among TE countries.
5 It is often
assumed that FDI in particular, promotes IIT, and thus also advances the technological
level of production, increasing productivity and income. Though FDI certainly
contributes to technological upgrading, the link between this effect and catching-up in
income terms, however, cannot be taken for sure when FDI establishes or hardens VIIT
structures.
There are some objections to a simple interpretation of VIIT being an expression of only
relative quality advantages. We roughly disentangled quality from cost advantages
6 and
3 For some data see also the Annex.
4 The VIIT and HIIT components of G-L indices are obtained by applying the usual method (see
Appendix).
5 The stock of FDI per capita was in 1997 at 1,587 US dollar for Hungary, 920 US dollar for the Czech
Republic, 377 US dollar for Poland and 387 US dollar for the Slovak Republic. See WIIW, 2001.
6 See Annex.__________________________________________________________________ IWH
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found almost all VIIT trade to be linked with a quality advantage of the EU in Panel A
(Table 3). While a quality advantage of the TE could be identified for 1993, we found
that it disappeared by 1997. Though the quality advantage of the EU also declined in
trade with both the Czech and Slovak Republics, these countries could not take
advantage of their improved position. The loss of quality advantage of the EU and both
of the TEs turned into appropriate gains of cost advantage. The picture is quite different
in Panel B. First, the quality advantage of the EU was not as great as in Panel A.
Second, it tended to erode more than in Panel A. The quality advantage of the TE was
obvious and increased in two out of four cases (Hungary and Slovakia).
We may draw two preliminary conclusions: (1) VIIT structures are a prevalent feature in
all trade – be it liberalised or non-liberalised, but VIIT amounts to significantly higher
shares in liberalised trade. (2) VIIT structures are dominated by quality advantages of
the EU, which increased in liberalised trade over time. The disappearance of the TEs’
quality advantage in Panel A in favour of cost advantages gives evidence of a quality-
based product cycle. In this cycle, the EU specialises in production at the high-quality,
and the TE in the low-quality, end of the continuum of differentiated goods.
2.2 Income distribution
Income is assumed to have a strong impact on the quality consumers demand. Income
distribution over households then plays a role in some models explaining IIT. Using
data from Luxembourg Income Studies (LIS) based upon household surveys, Lorenz
curves
7 for TE countries during two years of observation reveal a downward shift,
reflecting a re-distribution of income from poorer to richer households (Graph 1). The
re-distribution was the outcome of a complex set of forces. Due to the liberalisation
programmes, incomes from profit emerged as an increasingly important factor in income
re-distribution (Hölscher, 2001). In addition, labour market deregulation led to more
inequality in wages (Milanovic, 2000). Reforms of the tax system and strains on the
pension system contributed to re-distribution.
Income differences across countries and their change due to income re-distribution in
the individual countries are an important consideration in evaluating the impact of
international trade. E.G., how income re-distribution in one country changes the
difference against a second country, is an important issue. We may demonstrate by for
the case of the Czech Republic and the United Kingdom (Graph 2). The distance
between the two Lorenz curves in basis years 1991 (UK) and 1992 (Czech Republic)
illustrates that income distribution in the UK was more unequal than in the Czech
Republic. The picture changes for the year of comparison (1995/1996): more inequality
in the Czech Republic reduced the relative distance to the UK income distribution.
Additional information on the change of the distance in income distribution between TE
and EU countries are suggested by decile ratios – the ratio between income shares of the
7 A Lorenz curve below the 45
o line reflects an unequal income distribution. A downward shift of the
curve reports more inequality due to a shift of income from poorer households (lower deciles) to richer
households (higher deciles).IWH __________________________________________________________________
8
10th and the 1st decile. Income distribution in the TE country is more equal if the decile
ratio is lower than that of the EU (country). Both the Czech and Slovak Republics
provide an example of income distribution being relatively equal compared with the EU
in the basis year (Graph 3). On the contrary, income distribution was already more
unequal in Hungary and Poland in the basis years. Re-distribution was strong between
both years of comparison in all four cases, and it turned out to be stronger than in the
EU.
8 There was, hence, convergence between the Czech and Slovak Republics and the
EU region, but divergence between Hungary and Poland compared with the EU.
How income distribution may effect IIT, in combination with other determinants, is the
subject of the next section.
3. A review of IIT models and test results
3.1 Country and industry determinants
There is a rich literature examining the relationship between trade flows and country
and/or industry characteristics. The theoretical perspective behind these links is often
discussed as well as their empirical implementation. These studies typically construct an
index of intra-industry trade and investigate correlates of the index with country and/or
industry determinants. While these studies are certainly interesting, their relationship to
the theory of international trade is often tenuous and debatable
9. An important exception
is Helpman (1987) who developed some simple models of monopolistic competition
and tested some hypotheses, which were directly motivated by the theory. The empirical
literature has focused on “testing” all or a subset of the industry and country
determinants of IIT predicted by theory, finding more empirical support for country than
industry factors.
The “country approach” focuses on how country characteristics explain IIT (Helpman
and Krugman, 1985; Helpman, 1987; Hummels and Levinsohn, 1995)
10. Assuming all
intra-industry trade to be horizontally differentiated, a negative relationship is expected
to exist between IIT and GDP per capita differences. A positive relationship is expected
between HIIT and the minimum size of a country involved in trade and a negative
relationship is expected with the maximum size of the country involved in trade.
Helpman found that the data support these predictions.
11
Hummels and Levinsohn questioned the apparent empirical success of these models.
8 Comparable data were not available for Greece and Ireland.
9 For a survey see Leamer and Levinsohn (1995).
10 In this framework, usually two types of industries are considered, one producing the homogeneous and
the other producing the differentiated good. Within each type industries are equal and therefore there
are no reasons to test variations across them. The industrial perspective characterizes what is here
identified as the approach.
11 Alternative specifications are utilized for actual factor data versus differences in per capita income, for
cross-section versus panel and fixed versus random effects.__________________________________________________________________ IWH
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where s is the Grubel-Lloyd index for the bilateral trade of a country pair, j and k , with
β 1<0, β 2>0, and β 3<0. They found rather weak evidence of a negative relationship
between GDP per capita differences and IIT shares in OLS regressions. When
improving the explanatory power of their regressions by applying fixed effects, the sign
of β 1 turned positive and remained significant. They attributed this result to the fact that
the fixed effects regressions are controlling for the differences in distance and land
endowments, which affect the share of intra-industry trade, finding that the distance
effect
12 seems to be much stronger. They conclude in their “inconclusions” that “we
find, at best, very mixed empirical support for the theory. Contrary to factor differences
explaining the share of intra-industry trade, much of intra-industry trade appears to be
specific to the country-pair”.13
The basic message is that fixed effects estimates drastically change the empirical role of
factor and income differences
14, an effect emerging clearly even with random effects
estimates. The very mixed empirical support for the theory suggest that much intra-
industry trade appears to be specific to country-pairs rather than explained by
factor/income differences.
The “industry approach” forms another extensive literature on how IIT varies across
industries within countries, though empirical results in search of country/industry
determinants are not clearly related to the theory. Aturupane et al. (1997) analysed IIT in
EU-TE trade, where VIIT accounts between 80 per cent and 90 per cent of total IIT,
focusing on industry-specific determinants, and expecting country factors to be
particularly important for HIIT. This was, however, not the case. Only 1 out of 5 tested
industry determinants yielded the expected sign for VIIT, in two cases the odd sign was
obtained and in the remaining cases the result was hard to interpret due to the ambiguity
of the expected sign. For HIIT, three of the five variables showed the expected sign. By
using country dummies,
15 the explanatory power of the regressions increased
significantly for HIIT, but only slightly for VIIT. The basic conclusion is that industry
specific effects dominate VIIT. When vertical is empirically important for ITT, country-
specific effects become irrelevant and VIIT is better explained by industry rather than
12 The empirical success of the gravity models is well known.
13 Hummels and Levinsohn, op.cit. p. 828.
14 Recall the long-standing debate on whether per capita income is a proxy for factor endowments or
consumer tastes. Empirical literature has interpreted differences in per capita income both as a demand
side phenomenon as Bergstrand (1990) and as a proxy for differences in factor composition as in
Helpman (1987).
15 But proxies for “country specific factors” are dummies The use of country dummies is motivated by the
absence of reliable data on incomes and endowments for TE countries.IWH __________________________________________________________________
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country determinants.
We are now left with two problems: the first one has to do with the obvious fact that
VIIT and HIIT are determined by different factors. What happens when the “country
approach” takes into account the stylised facts on intra-industry trade, that is the relative
importance of VIIT in TE-EU (liberalised) trade? Hummel und Levinsohn argued that
the weak significance of the GDP per capita variable without fixed effects and the
change of the sign with fixed effects should be explained by country-pair specifics.
However, the result might also be consistent with models of intra-industry trade in
vertically differentiated products. The fixed effects might control for differences across
countries when VIIT, not HIIT, matters.
The second problem is linked with the identification of additional changeable country
factors (instead of ‘unknown’ fixed effects) and with their explicit testing (instead of
implicit testing via country dummies) in order to find a better explanation of trade flows
variations whenever HIIT and VIIT are identified. The model of vertically differentiated
intra-industry trade of Flam and Helpman (1987) for a North-South context offers an
interesting theoretical perspective also for EU-TE trade by including income distribution
in the pool of country factors. A brief outline will demonstrate the structure of the
model.
3.2 A model with income distribution
The model explains the demand for different varieties of the same good due to
indivisibilities in consumption and variation in income across countries. The less
developed country, say: the TE, produces a homogenous good and the low-quality
variety of the differentiated product whilst the developed country, here: the EU,
produces the high-quality variety. On the production side, both countries have the same
unit labor requirements to produce the homogeneous good but different unit labor
requirements to produce one unit of the differentiated good with quality level q, a(q),
a*(q), both positive and convex in the quality level. Their ratio Z= a*(q)/a(q) is assumed
to increase in q so that the EU has an absolute advantage in producing all quality levels.
The reason why the EU does not produce the entire quality range of the differentiated
product is the possible comparative advantage of the TE in producing the low quality
varieties The problem now is to identify the splitting between the two regions of the
“chain“ of comparative advantages, defined by quality levels with a continuum of
varieties Z(q) of the differentiated commodity.
The demand for a specific variety is associated with different income levels of
consumers: consumers have different effective labour endowments, and consumers with
higher effective labour endowments earn higher income and demand higher quality
varieties of the differentiated good. It is possible to describe the distribution of income
over households by density functions for the EU and for the TE. These functions denote
also the density of the distribution of effective labour endowments over households.
The model is solved for a dividing income level at which consumers are indifferent
against quality, but respond to changes in the relative price of varieties.
Consumers/households with higher income purchase high-quality varieties and with__________________________________________________________________ IWH
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lower income low-quality ones. The dividing income class determines the split of
demand for quality in both countries and the relative wage rate. The explicit expression
for the share of VIIT in total trade according to Flam and Helpman reads
(2)
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The income of the consumers/households being indifferent against quality is the product
of the wage ratio and the amount of effective labour offered by these households. As
shown by Graph 4 with density functions g for EU and g* for TE, for an arbitrary
relative wage ω , TE exports varieties with quality levels between ql and qd whereas the
EU exports varieties with quality between qd and qh.. Expression (2) describes how a
change of the relative wage level, of the size (labour supply) and of the dividing income
class influence the share of (vertical) intra-industry trade in total trade. The most
interesting determinants are the changes in the relative wage and in income distribution.
Assume the EU country increases productivity in its high-quality goods industry. The
wage level will follow to increase and so ϖ . The EU demand for the low-quality will
increase (qd moves to the right) and so the share of vertical intra-industry trade. This is
the income effect. Flam and Helpman show that some of the factors which affect the
equilibrium relative wage (w/w*) may have indirect effects on S via a change of the
dividing income level (price effect). In the case demonstrated, demand for the low-
quality variety will exceed supply (since productivity in the TE remained unchanged),
and the price of the low-quality variety will increase, and the wage rate w* too. The
result is a fall in the dividing income level in both countries and an appropriate fall of
F(hd)a n dF * ( h d*). Whilst the income effect causes S to increase, the price effect causes
it to decrease – the aggregate effect remains ambiguous.
Let us now assume that in the TE income distribution becomes more unequal to the
detriment of the poorer households (see Graph 5), and demand for imported goods
increases. Consumers in both countries now face a higher price level for qh but only the
EU wage rate w would increase. EU households with the dividing income would react
on higher prices for qh and shift their demand to ql, produced in the TE. With a new
16 The ratio between both shares yields the parameter term in expression (2).IWH __________________________________________________________________
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dividing income class, F(hd) would increase. The same happened in the TE since part of
the consumers with the dividing income shift their demand to the low quality product.
Again, the dividing income increases, and F*(hd*) would follow. In both cases, and
according to (2) the share of VIIT in total trade would be higher.
Expression (2) may be a good candidate to disentangle different determinants of both
HIIT and VIIT in the EU-TE context where the EU stands for a region of more
developed countries and the TE for a region of less developed ones. The model predicts
that the volume and share of VIIT between two countries may be positively related to
the difference in their per capita GDP (as a proxy for the relative wage assuming zero
growth of labour supply) and to the distance in income distribution. Durkin and Krygier
(2000) tested the model for US-OCED trade. They found the expected signs and
significant coefficients for GDP per capita, income distribution and distance, but
ambiguous results for the size variable.
4. Results
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where sjk is the share (in logs) of intra-industry trade between country j and country k in
total trade. As a proxy for the average wage we use the GDP per capita. The log form
ln(GDPCk-GDPCj) reports changes in the relative difference between each pair of
countries. The next variable is a proxy for changes in labour supply (or population
growth) when wages are given. The variable represents the size gap between each pair
of countries. Regressions were estimated with maximum values as well as minimum
values. All domestic GDP data had been converted into US dollar terms based upon the
average exchange rate of the prevailing year.17 lnID represents a change in the distance
in income distribution between each pair of countries as a proxy for a shift in the
dividing income level; ε is the disturbance term. The income distribution variable is
calculated as bilateral relative decile ratio (see Annex). The share of intra-industry trade
is calculated as total IIT, HIIT and VIIT for each panel A and B and for the entire panel
(A+B). GDP per capita data were taken from OECD (2001). Regressions were estimated
using OLS.
In Hummel/Levinsohn there is no income distribution variable, but there is a
specification with fixed effects. In Durkin/Krygier, income distribution (though
differently calculated) plays an important role and there are spatial distance plus fixed
effects in addition. We neglect spatial distance due to the relatively close location of all
countries in the sample, and fixed effects.
17 For testing robustness of the estimates, we also run regressions with data in purchasing power terms.
We found no major differences in results.__________________________________________________________________ IWH
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The theoretical predictions drawn form our model for HIIT and VIIT show
(1) opposite relationship for HIIT and VIIT if per capital GDP and capital-labour
ratios are correlated,
(2) a major role for income distribution in explaining VIIT whereas it has no role in
the case of HIIT, and
(3) a positive impact on VIIT if the developed country/region is significantly larger
than the less developed country.
In the first stage, we estimate regressions without income distribution and compare the
results with those Hummel/Levinsohn obtained for total IIT. Hummel/Levinsohn
obtained a positive sign for the coefficient of the relative difference variable in
explaining IIT with fixed effects regressions. Whilst the estimated importance of the
relative difference for IIT and HIIT remained ambiguous, our results are clearer. Our
estimates yield a positive sign for β 1 of both IIT and HIIT (Table 4, columns 1 and 2).
Since the coefficient is not significant we found that differences in GDP per capita
seems indeed not to have any explanatory power for IIT.
Testing for VIIT we found, like Durkin/Krygier a significant and positive coefficient for
the relative difference (column 3). The difference in GDP per capita has a significant
impact on VIIT. The split of the dataset into Panel A and Panel B confirms the picture
we found for total trade. The coefficients of variables are significant for explaining VIIT
in Panel A and have positive signs (column 3a). Coefficients remained insignificant in
explaining HIIT (column 2a). Results do not show any explanatory result for Panel B
(columns 2b and 3b). These results confirm, first, the separation of VIIT from total IIT,
and second, the separation of liberalised from non-liberalised trade in VIIT. The
explanatory power of the model is stronger for Panel A than for Panel B, and
coefficients are mostly significant.
The second stage includes the income distribution variable in the empirical
specification. We omit results on the entire Panel and focus on Panel A and B. In line
with Durkin/Krygier, we expect GDP per capita difference to be positively related to
vertical and negative or non-significant for horizontal trade. Indeed, we found no
explanation for horizontal trade and, hence, due to the marginal role HIIT plays in total
trade, for IIT in Panel A (Table 5, columns 1a and 2a). The picture changes for VIIT.
The difference in GDP per capita has the expected positive sign and is significant for
Panel A (column 3a). We expected further income distribution to have a positive effect
on the share of VIIT and to be unrelated to the share of HIIT. We obtained, however,
income distribution to have a negative sign and to be only weakly significant for VIIT
and to be unrelated to HIIT. The explanatory power of the regression including income
distribution is not remarkably higher than excluding it for Panel A.
Again, no results for B were achieved (columns 1b throughout 3b), underlining the
assumption that the tested variables (excluding income distribution) have an important
impact on VIIT only when trade is liberalised.IWH __________________________________________________________________
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We tested the regressions for unadjusted G-L indices and found no major deviation from
results obtained for adjusted indices. The low explanatory power of the regressions
might be a result of some country specifics and could be improved by running re-
gressions with fixed effects. OLS regression only for the Czech Republic and for Panel
A provide some evidence for this assumption. The model explains 60 per cent of VIIT
(Table 6, column 3a) with the income distribution variable negative (but significant) and
relative difference again positive and significant. The explanatory power of the model
including distribution is higher than excluding it. It could be mentioned here that both
the Czech and the Slovak Republics are characterised by an income distribution pattern
different from that of Hungary and Poland. This was possibly due to the history of
Czechoslovakia, which split in 1993. Generally speaking, income distribution in the
Czech and Slovak Republics tended to converge toward the EU level while it tended to
diverge in cases of Hungary and Poland (recall Graph 3). The weak explanatory results
of income distribution for VIIT leaves two questions yet unanswered: first, there is
rather an explanation of more inequality provided by increasing VIIT, or second, more
convergence in income distribution should rather explain HIIT (in the Czech and Slovak
cases), the latter assumptions remain to be tested with a better dataset.
5. Concluding remarks
There is strong evidence that VIIT between the European Union and Transition eco-
nomies was influenced by differences between countries, whenever trade was free. This
result confirms the main line in the literature, pointing to the superior importance of
country factors rather than industry factors for overwhelmingly vertically structured IIT.
We found further that vertical structures accounted for the major part of liberalised
trade, and here, differences in GDP per capita and the size of the countries matters.
Relative income distribution over time and across countries seem to be rather irrelevant.
Then we may ask (neglecting possible data defects): is income distribution indeed an
exogenous variable or rather does it depend on VIIT? There is a rich debate on whether
and how globalisation and technology changes alter the relative demand for unskilled
and skilled workers. Recent empirical research found that product-cycle driven
technology transfer from advanced countries to less advanced countries seems to be a
source of skill upgrading and rising (wage) inequality in both regions (Chun Zu, 2000).
What remains really interesting from the product-quality cycle model is the wage
difference between both countries. We found the proxy – the GDP per capita – to have a
significant and positive influence on the share of VIIT. Let trade start in a situation of
given differences in skill endowment in EU and TE. If the EU were able to improve
productivity in its high-quality industry, the increasing wage rate would support more
demand for low-quality goods, and then the EU can transfer product-cycle goods to the
TE countries. The latter might improve productivity and wages in the low-quality
industry as we have seen by hand of Graph 4. Though this were still progress compared
with the situation inherited from former socialist times, the wage difference remains
strong and might even increase. In that case, technical upgrading in the TE would be de-
linked from catching-up in productivity and income terms.__________________________________________________________________ IWH
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Grubel-Lloyd indices of intra-industry trade between EU(15) and TE (4), 1993 and 1997
TE year unadjusted adjusted
Panel A+B
Czech Republic 1993 0.383 0.584
1997 0.521 0.711
Hungary 1993 0.366 0.377
1997 0.412 0.438
Poland 1993 0.199 0.291
1997 0.198 0.382
Slovakia 1993 0.236 0.312
1997 0.291 0.376
Panel A
Czech Republic 1993 0.304 0.823
1997 0.497 0.848
Hungary 1993 0.408 0.648
1997 0.539 0.772
Poland 1993 0.238 0.957
1997 0.172 0.992
Slovakia 1993 0.254 0.890
1997 0.352 0.875
Panel B
Czech Republic 1993 0.506 0.565
1997 0.563 0.567
Hungary 1993 0.355 0.375
1997 0.372 0.377
Poland 1993 0.164 0.175
1997 0.229 0.243
Slovakia 1993 0.221 0.264
1997 0.230 0.270




Grubel-Lloyd indices of vertical intral-industry trade between EU (15) and TE (4), 1003 and
1997
TE year unadjusted adjusted
Panel A+B
Czech Republic 1993 0.320 0.487
1997 0.435 0.594
Hungary 1993 0.292 0.301
1997 0.338 0.359
Poland 1993 0.175 0.256
1997 0.152 0.295
Slovakia 1993 0.185 0.245
1997 0.221 0.285
Panel A
Czech Republic 1993 0.297 0.803
1997 0.474 0.808
Hungary 1993 0.407 0.647
1997 0.537 0.769
Poland 1993 0.228 0.917
1997 0.166 0.955
Slovakia 1993 0.244 0.854
1997 0.318 0.791
Panel B
Czech Republic 1993 0.356 0.397
1997 0.367 0.370
Hungary 1993 0.264 0.278
1997 0.276 0.279
Poland 1993 0.128 0.137
1997 0.135 0.143
Slovakia 1993 0.134 0.160
1997 0.123 0.144




The distribution of quality-based VIIT between EU and TEs (adjusted G-L indices)
TE year EU TE
Panel A+B
Czech Republic 1993 0,328 0,027
1997 0,583 0,001
Hungary 1993 0,084 0,114
1997 0,143 0,131
Poland 1993 0,148 0,043
1997 0,206 0,027
Slovakia 1993 0,193 0,019
1997 0,191 0,018
Panel A
Czech Republic 1993 0,655 0,013
1997 0,583 0,001
Hungary 1993 0,258 0,000
1997 0,558 0,000
Poland 1993 0,625 0,000
1997 0,924 0,002
Slovakia 1993 0,748 0,063
1997 0,584 0,000
Panel B
Czech Republic 1993 0,195 0,042
1997 0,201 0,026
Hungary 1993 0,065 0,145
1997 0,056 0,164
Poland 1993 0,057 0,058
1997 0,041 0,032
Slovakia 1993 0,105 0,014
1997 0,071 0,033

























































































































































19 9 2 1 996
Source: Own calculation based upon LIS data.IWH_______________________________________________________________________
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Basis year Year of comparison
*excluding Greece and Ireland
Source: Own calculation based upon LIS data.
Graph 2: Income distribution: differences between the
















































































































































None None None None None None None
Adj. R
2 0.30 0.06 0.29 0.11 0.24 0.011 0.081
Note: IIT = intra-industry trade; HIIT = horizontal intra-industry trade; VIIT = vertical intra-industry trade.
The absolute value of the t-statistics are in parentheses. Each regression contains 88 observations.
Table 5:
OLS regressions with income distribution on the shares of intra-industry trade of TE
countries.















































































Adj.R2 0.31 0.013 0.25 0.06 0.005 0.10
Note: IIT = intra-industry trade; HIIT = horizontal intra-industry trade; VIIT = vertical intra- industry trade. The
absolute value of the t-statistics are in parentheses. Each regression contains 88 observations._______________________________________________________________________IWH
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Table 6:

























































Adj. R2 0.48 0.54 0.16 0.50 0.60
Note: IIT = intra-industry trade; HIIT = horizontal intra-industry trade; VIIT = vertical intra-industry trade. The
absolute value of the t-statistics are in parentheses.
Annex: Data and methods
(1) Trade
We use data from the Combined Nomenclature (CN) of EUROSTAT. This dataset enables the
decomposition of product groups according to their degree of explicit liberalisation by hand
of the European Agreements, the information source being Annex IV or IVa. The agreements
provide a complete list of 8-digit CN chapters when describing the extent and dynamics of
agreed trade liberalisation. Since calculation cannot be performed at the 8-digit level (too
many zero observations), we chose the 4-digit one.
1 Nevertheless, this product setting seems
close to the reality of liberalized and less liberalized trade. The selected chapters stay for
about 26 per cent of total EU-TE trade in 1993 and 18 per cent in 1997.
Panel A includes all four-digit CN categories of manufactured goods from CN chapters 30,
33-38, 84, 86, and 88-90 whose trade was almost completely liberalized immediately after the
IA with the EU came into effect. For the Czech Republic, we found 100 4-digit items, for
Hungary only 29 items, for Poland 81 items and for Slovakia 100 items. Trade between the
EU and Hungary is somewhat different concerning panel A: when the interim agreement
came into force, custom duties of the Union were not abolished, but were reduced to two-
thirds of the basic rate on 1 March 1992, and to one-third on 1 January 1993. Tariffs were
abolished from 1994 onwards. Hungary followed the course taken by the other three countries
with a one-year delay – which may be responsible for some differences in price-quality gaps
and in IIT and VIIT indices.
1 Zero observations do not mean that there was no trade. Statistical reporting is obliged to some degree of
confidence, that is the reader should not be able to identify companies. On the 8-digit level this might be
possible. Of course, the 4-digit level restrains somewhat the explanatory merits of the dataset.IWH_______________________________________________________________________
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Panel B includes 137 four-digit items of the CN chapters 50-63: mainly textiles and clothing.
Trade in these items was initially not liberalized (with few exceptions). Liberalization was
planned to be completed six years after the agreement came into effect in March 1992, and
therefore by the end of 1998. Of course, both panels may include some items, which belong to
the other, or even to neither of them.
Panel B data also include subcontracting or outward processing trade (OPT). The share of
OPT in total EU imports in textiles and clothing was at 29 per cent in 1996 (Pellegrin, 1998).
The share in German imports from the four TE countries in chapters 62 and 63 (clothing) was
at 75 per cent for both the Czech and Slovak Republics, 85 per cent for Hungary, and 90 per
cent for Poland in 1996 (Möbus, 1998). OPT played no remarkable role in most of other
chapters, particularly 80 to 90. In these ‘industries’ foreign direct investment seemed to have
a more influential role for trade structures than OPT (Lemoine, 1998).
The usual procedure (see for example Greenaway, Hine and Milner 1994, and Aturupane et
al. 1998) for decomposing VIIT and HIIT is the application of relative unit values (RUVs)
inside and outside a selected range. A RUV outside the range selected, here: 15 per cent on
either side of unity, is not necessarily a quality indicator. The economic theory of index
numbers develops the conditions under which a unit value index reflects a change in the
quality vector of a bundle of commodities when prices are fixed. When prices are not fixed,
quality and cost may have changed. A RUV higher than 1.15 may reflect an export price
higher than the import price due to either a cost disadvantage or a quality advantage of the
EU.
2 Both scenarios root in completely different worlds: the first approach in the world of
perfect competition with homogenous goods where profits tend to zero, and costs determine
the price. The second scenario is that of monopolistic competition, hence, differentiated goods
where profits are permanent due to quality differences.
One procedure to identify roughly the appropriate advantage in traded items is to link the
individual RUVs with the quantities traded, that is the trade balance of the items (Aiginger,
1997).
3 We can identify four cases or examples important for our selection procedure:
(1) If the RUV > 1.15 the export unit value exceeds the import unit value. If this gap
reflects a quality advantage of the EU, the EU should achieve a trade surplus (despite
higher prices). Otherwise, the gap reflects a cost disadvantage of the EU, which is hard
to reconcile with an export surplus. Hence, if RUV>1.15, we assume that the EU
exports higher quality with respect to imports of the same item. Intra-industry trade is
ruled by quality and technology. In this way we can formulate the remaining cases:
(2) If the RUV< 0.85 and the EU has realized a deficit in trade, the TE is assumed to have
a quality advantage. In this case, the EU exports goods of lower quality compared with
imported goods. Again, intra-industry trade is ruled by quality and technology.
2 There are, of course, implicit trade barriers as, for example, transfer pricing and false invoicing. A higher
price of EU produced items in exports to the TE might reflect those practices. We don’t think that this issue
will influence the comparison between panels and between HIIT and VIIT. We rather assume that those
practice is equally distributed in trade.
3 A more preferable method – the estimation of price elasticities – requires time series, which, however, are not
available._______________________________________________________________________IWH
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(3) If the RUV>1.15 and the EU has realized a deficit, the TE is assumed to have a cost
advantage. Intra-industry trade is determined by factor endowment and other cost
specific factors.
(4) If the RUV<0.85 and the EU has realized a surplus, the EU is assumed to have a cost
advantage.
(2) Income distribution
Durkin and Krygier (2000) constructed the income distribution value by cumulating
household deciles in a US-OECD framework along with x-axis of the Lorenz curve setting.
They set income of the lowest US quintile in PPS as the overlapping income class assuming
that household quintiles above this class demand for higher quality and households below
demand for lower quality. The alternative would be to calculated along with the y-axis
(cumulating income shares up to the dividing quintile/decile). The main problem with both
approaches is a possibly severe distortion caused by the incomparability of average incomes
in the overlapping income class -- known as the problem of “within” and “between”. There
might be a shift of the entire distribution frame of the country with given income distribution
– an effect better captured by the size variable in the model. Without any change in the
income distribution in both countries the distance between average incomes might increase at
an extent that any overlapping income class might be get lost. This is the more plausible as in
TE countries the period between 1993 and 1997 was characterised by strong income shifts in
international currency due to PPS and exchange rate developments.
4 We avoided all kind of
income figures in international currencies and calculated decile ratios for each country and
relative decile ratios for each country pair in order to catch only the “within” effects. Decile
and relative decile ratios are presented in Tables A1 and A2 for both years of comparison.
Data were taken from Luxembourg Income Studies (LIS) with the exception of Slovakia and
Portugal. For both data were taken from official statistics. Data include in all cases two years
of comparison being not necessarily 1993 and 1997 (for example, basis year for Spain was
1981). Data for Ireland include only one year.
4 To give an example: The average income of the highest decile in Slovakia decreased between 1993 and 1997,
and the average income of the lowest decile in the United Kingdom increased (all in PPS terms). IWH_______________________________________________________________________
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Decile Ratios 3.80 6.76 6.94 3.44
Austria 4.61 0.83 1.47 1.50 0.75
Belgium 4.25 0.90 1.59 1.63 0.81
Denmark 5.22 0.73 1.30 1.33 0.66
Finland 4.19 0.91 1.62 1.66 0.82
France 7.60 0.50 0.89 0.91 0.45
Germany 5.28 0.72 1.28 1.31 0.65
Ireland 8.59 0.44 0.79 0.81 0.40
Italy 6.53 0.58 1.04 1.06 0.53
Netherlands 6.38 0.60 1.06 1.09 0.54
Sweden 5.11 0.74 1.32 1.36 0.67
Spain 8.75 0.43 0.77 0.79 0.39
UK 9.04 0.42 0.75 0.77 0.38
means 6.29 0.65 1.16 1.19 0.59
Source: Own calculations based upon LIS data (except Slovakia); Slovakia: Statistical Office of the Slovak
Republic, 1999.
Note: For decile ratios, income shares of 10
th over 1
st deciles in individual countries.





Decile Ratios 5.21 8.97 10.54 4.48
Austria 7.36 0.71 1.22 1.43 0.61
Belgium 5.70 0.91 1.57 1.85 0.79
Denmark 4.43 1.18 2.02 2.38 1.01
Finland 4.43 1.18 2.02 2.38 1.01
France 6.53 0.80 1.37 1.61 0.69
Germany 6.03 0.87 1.49 1.75 0.74
Ireland 8.59 0.61 1.04 1.23 0.52
Italy 11.59 0.45 0.77 0.91 0.39
Netherlands 6.42 0.81 1.40 1.64 0.70
Sweden 5.25 0.99 1.71 2.01 0.85
Spain 7.61 0.68 1.18 1.38 0.59
UK 10.00 0.52 0.90 1.05 0.45
means 6.99 0.81 1.39 1.64 0.70
Source: Own calculation based upon LIS data (except Slovakia); Slovakia: Statistical Office of the Slovak
Republic, 1999.
Note: For decile ratios, income shares of 10
th over 1
st deciles in individual countries.